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REEXAMINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE BINARY: POLITICS, 
IDENTITY, AND LAW 
 
Marvin L. Astrada & Scott B. Astrada* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Politicized identity, which finds expression in the law, is binary-
based. In light of the role that it plays in national political and legal 
debates triggered by various groups challenging identity-based binaries, 
this article reexamines the integrity of the binary that lies at the core of 
how courts construe legal identity. Basic-identity binaries have and 
continue to play a profound role in legal thought and practice. This 
article thus explores the relationship and tension between law and 
binary-based identity signifiers. We explore the notion that the law’s 
use of the binary-based identity signifier is premised on antiquated 
assumptions and simplified schemata that, to better recognize rights and 
apply judicial remedies and protections of individuals and groups that 
fall outside the binary, will perhaps require the courts to adopt a more 
flexible approach to identity. Politicized identity may be at the heart of 
contestations between those who wish to preserve and those who wish 
to obliterate basic binaries, but the law is a special case and will be 
uniquely affected by the fallout that results from this process. We thus 
employ case law and concepts from philosophy and legal theory to flesh 
out an emerging problem in the law. Our intent in this paper is to 
reexamine the basic binary nature of legal identity, the components and 
dynamics that undergird it, the consequences that result from its 
application, and the tensions and challenges that result from rejecting 
the integrity of the binary within law. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the present political environment, politicized identity 
encompasses a variety of disparate and passionate debates over the form 
and substance of public policy, from who is legally allowed to use which 
gendered public bathroom to reformulating trade policy from an 
“America First” perspective.1 Recently, politicized identity has fueled 
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widespread social protests (and counter-protests) against political 
parties, the Administration, and political or cultural entities such as the 
“media” or “Hollywood.”2 A major driver of identity-based protest and 
resistance in the present has been the Trump Administration’s 
sociocultural, economic, and political agenda—one that is firmly rooted 
in traditional notions of societal order in place before the late 1960s.3 
Indeed, the proclaimed agenda to “Make America Great Again” 
involves breathing life into traditional sociocultural binaries that 
underpinned identity, such as White/Black,4 Citizen/Alien,5 and 
Male/Female,6 and the corresponding privilege of one half of the binary 
over the other. Resistance to this agenda is based, in part, on the 
realization that a transition back toward traditional binaries is 
problematic and potentially harmful.7 In fact, traditional binaries have 
historically been the basis for exclusionary, if not discriminatory, public 
policy.8 In light of the modern historical struggle against identity-based 
binaries that began in the 1960s, and recent resistance and protests 
                                                 
1 See America First Foreign Policy, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy (last visited Dec. 23, 2017); 
America First Energy Plan, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-
first-energy (last visited Dec. 23, 2017). 
2 See Emanuella Grinberg & Madison Park, Second Day of Protests over Trump's 
Immigration Policies, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017, 1:42 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/us-immigration-protests/index.html.  
3 See Gregory Krieg, Donald Trump Reveals when He Thinks America was Great, 
CNN (Mar. 28, 2016, 5:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/26/politics/donald-
trump-when-america-was-great/index.html. 
4 See Jonathan Mahler, Donald Trump’s Message Resonates with White 
Supremacists, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/us/politics/donald-trump-supremacists.html. 
5 See Anna Brand, Donald Trump: I Would Force Mexico to Build Border Wall, 
MSNBC (June 28, 2015, 2:11 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/donald-trump-i-
would-force-mexico-build-border-wall.  
6 See Molly Ball, What Kind of Man is Donald Trump?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/donald-trump-and-the-
women/503402/. 
7 See, e.g., 100 Ways, in 100 Days, that Trump Has Hurt Americans, CENTER FOR 
AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 26, 2017), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/general/news/2017/04/26/431299/100-
ways-100-days-trump-hurt-americans/. 
8  See generally Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction, 
Racism as a Social Problem Is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on 
the Social Construction of Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16 (2005) (discussing the 
role of race in conversations about the differences between groups). 
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centered on racial, ethnic, sex/gender, and socio-economic critiques of 
societal order, traditional binary-based identities require 
reexamination.9 In particular, it is necessary to reevaluate the 
underlying assumptions and effects of a binary-based cultural and social 
identity matrix, as well as what place, if any, binary-based identity 
signifiers have in the present.10 
As the defining ethos of the current Administration, the return 
of the U.S. to an idyllic time where identities were concrete and self-
contained is based, in part, on interjecting traditional identity-based 
binaries with renewed energy and legitimacy in the realm of law and 
public policy. Consider, for instance, the legal and public policy debate 
that took place over which public restrooms transgender individuals 
must use in North Carolina—and the previous (Obama) and current 
(Trump) Administrations’ antipodal reactions to the matter.11 The 
bathroom controversy reveals a deeper tension that is emerging in the 
law regarding the role of politicized identity in the legal and policy 
realms.12 Other states, such as Texas, also considered pursuing 
                                                 
9 See Krieg, supra note 3. 
10 See Oregon First US State to Add Third Gender Option on Driver ID, BBC (June 
16, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40309362 (“Beginning in 
July, Oregon residents who do not identify as male or female can mark X for sex on 
driver's licenses, learner's permits and state IDs.”); Casey Parks, Oregon Court 
Allows Person to Change Sex from “Female” to “Non-Binary,” THE 
OREGONIAN/OREGONLIVE (June 10, 2016),  
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2016/06/oregon_court_allows_person
_to.html (detailing In the Matter of Sex Change of Jamie Shupe, wherein an Oregon 
Circuit Court found “that a transgender person can legally change their sex to ‘non-
binary’ rather than male or female in what legal experts believe is a first in the 
United States. Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge Amy Holmes Hehn legally 
changed 52-year-old Jamie Shupe's sex from ‘female’ to non-binary.”). 
11 See Sandhya Somashekhar, et al., Trump Administration Rolls Back Protections 
for Transgender Students, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-administration-rolls-back-
protections-for-transgender-students/2017/02/22/550a83b4-f913-11e6-bf01-
d47f8cf9b643_story.html?utm_term=.469f6b2bb7ee. 
12 See e.g., Daniel Trotta, Trump Revokes Obama Guidelines on Transgender 
Bathrooms, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
lgbt-idUSKBN161243; Katy Steinmetz, President Trump Just Rolled Back 
Guidelines That Protected Transgender Students, TIME (Feb. 23, 2017), 
http://time.com/4679063/donald-trump-transgender-bathroom/ (At the time of this 
writing, the North Carolina legislature repealed the so-called bathroom bill and the 
Governor signed off on the repeal.); Mark Berman & Amber Phillips, North 
Carolina Governor Signs Bill Repealing and Replacing Transgender Bathroom Law 
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legislation to emplace people within a traditional Male/Female identity 
binary.13  
In light of the role that politicized identity is playing in the 
present,14 and the national political and legal debates that have been 
triggered by various groups challenging the integrity of identity-based 
binaries,15 this article examines the fundamental conflict between the 
reactionary move toward reestablishing identity-based binaries (and 
their underlying assumptions), and resistance to such binaries, and 
contends that as the American polity has become increasingly more 
diverse, traditional binaries such as Male/Female, 
Heterosexual/Homosexual, and Black/White, have become 
representationally inadequate. American society has become more 
politically diversified along racial, ethnic, and sex/gender identity lines, 
and the culturally homogenous norm of the “average American” has 
drastically shifted since the late 1960s.16 
The conflict between those adhering to traditional binaries and 
those questioning the assumptions underlying said binaries can be 
readily observed in law and public policy.17 Indeed, law plays a central 
role in these present conflicts, as many of the actions taken and policies 
advanced by the current Administration are being challenged in the 
                                                 
Amid Criticism, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/03/30/north-carolina-
lawmakers-say-theyve-agreed-on-a-deal-to-repeal-the-bathroom-
bill/?utm_term=.25638df206ad. 
13 See e.g., Katy Steinmetz, Texas Senate Approves Controversial Bathroom Bill 
After Five-Hour Debate, TIME (Mar. 15, 2017), http://time.com/4701658/texas-
senate-bathroom-bill-sb6-transgender/; Anti-Transgender Law Map, EQUALITY 
FED’N, http://www.equalityfederation.org/lac/antitrans/ (showing several other states 
other states are currently considering similar bills) (last visited Dec. 23, 2017). 
14 See supra notes 8–11.  
15 See supra notes 17–18.  
16 See generally Robert D. Putnam, E pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in 
the Twenty‐First Century: The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, 30 SCANDINAVIAN 
POL. STUD. 137 (2007) (discussing the long and short-term effects on communities 
as a result of sharp increases in immigration); Jean S. Phinney & Anthony D. Ong, 
Conceptualization and Measurement of Ethnic Identity: Current Status and Future 
Directions, 54 J. OF COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY 271 
(2007) (exploring how individuals understand their ethnic identities); Rodney, E. 
Hero & Caroline J. Tolbert, Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and 
Policy in the States of the U.S., 40 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 851, 856–59 (1996). 
17 See, e.g., Chris Dolan, Letting Go of the Gender Binary: Charting New Pathways 
for Humanitarian Interventions on Gender-Based Violence, 849 INT’L REV. OF THE 
RED CROSS 485, 488 (2015). 
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courts.18 Legal challenges to identity-based binaries have resulted in 
exposing a complex relationship between the courts’ reliance on binary-
based constructs to administer justice,19 and combatting discriminatory 
policies and practices.20 Ironically, in an age of increasing rejection of 
binary-based identity signifiers, the courts have relied on legal schema 
that utilize such signifiers to protect vulnerable and marginalized 
communities.21  
We therefore utilize select case law, such as Footnote Four of United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.,22 to illustrate and explore the deep 
binary-based nature of identity-based jurisprudence to further examine 
and discuss the conflicts between the basic binary nature of legal 
identity, the components and dynamics that undergird it, the 
consequences that result from its application, and the tensions and 
challenges that result from rejecting the integrity of the binary within 
law.23 This article’s reexamination of the integrity of the binary is 
designed to foster critical reflection and debate; it seeks to provoke 
discussion on whether it is desirable to scrap the binary, retain it, or if 
possible to apply it in the law to reflect changes in the make-up of 
society.24 Going forward, we discuss the politics and complexity of 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Meridith Mcgraw et al., A Timeline of Trump's Immigration Executive 
Order and Legal Challenges, ABC NEWS (June 29, 2017), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-president-trumps-immigration-executive-
order-legal-challenges/story?id=45332741. 
19 Smith v. Avanti, 249 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1200–01 (D. Colo. 2017). 
20 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the affirmative 
action admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School because the 
University had a compelling interest in pursuing a race-conscious admissions 
process that may favor underrepresented minority groups.); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
US 1 (1948) (holding that courts cannot constitutionally enforce racial covenants on 
real estate). 
21 See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 155 n.4 (1938) (positing 
that discrete and insular minorities may require heightened judicial protection). 
22 Id.  
23 See Tara Dunnavant, Bye-Bye Binary: Transgender Prisoners and the Regulation 
of Gender in the Law, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 15, 16–17, 20, 32, 35 (2016). 
24 Despite the Trump Administration’s promises to further entrench the binary, a 
recent ruling from the District Court of Massachusetts, Kosilek v. Spencer illustrates 
how the law is reassessing the binary-based identity signifiers that have been relied 
upon to make sense of juridical subjects. 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d 
en banc, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). The Kosilek court found that the Department of 
Corrections violated the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” 
clause in refusing to provide gender confirmation surgery to prisoner Michelle 
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identity within the law to contextualize the binary.25 We then examine 
the relationship between politicized identity, culture, and the binary-
based nature of identity in the law.26 The complex relationship between 
the binary, identity, and the juridical subject is then critically 
examined.27 We analyze and discuss the power dynamics and 
consequences of employing the binary in law.28 Lastly, we conclude our 
reexamination of the integrity of the binary in the administration of 
justice.29  
 
 
I. THE INTEGRITY OF THE BINARY – THE POLITICS & COMPLEXITY 
OF IDENTITY IN THE LAW 
 
A. Contextualizing the Binary in the Law: Constructing Legal 
Identity 
 
This section explores the role of the binary in law, and the 
conceptual integrity of the binary that lies at the core of legal identity 
                                                 
Kosilek, and granted injunctive relief for Kosilek to receive the surgery. Id. at 251. 
This case exemplifies how recent challenges to the binary nature of identity are 
affecting judicial remedies and protections. Notably, the Kosilek decision — which 
was overturned on appeal— is unique in its expansion of the scope of judicial 
remedies and protections under law. Despite being overturned, the decision is 
indicative of why, going forward, it is important to ask what insight can be gained by 
critically reexamining entrenched binary-based identity signifiers, especially in the 
context of civil rights and identity in the law. Dunnavant, supra note 23, at 15–16 
(“The [Kosilek] decision represented the first time a U.S. prison was court ordered to 
provide a transgender prisoner with this type of surgery.”). Although it was 
overturned, the decision is nevertheless instructive on discussions of binary-based 
identities and their use in the law. Dunnavant notes that, “Judge Thompson, in her 
dissenting opinion, criticizes the majority for employing de novo review to the 
highly factual issue of deliberate indifference, instead of a deferential, clear error 
standard. If the court had employed the proper standard, according to Thompson, 
they would have accepted the district court’s factual determinations, as the majority 
of experts in the case concurred that gender confirmation surgery was medically 
necessary for Kosilek and the evidence presented at trial provided ample support for 
the district court’s conclusions.” Id. at 17 (citations omitted). 
25 See infra Part I. 
26 See infra Part II 
27 See infra Part III. 
28 See infra Part IV. 
29 See infra Conclusion. 
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that the courts have traditionally employed to adjudicate cases. The 
intent is to emphasize the importance of revisiting the binary as it is 
conceptualized and applied in law. First, it is necessary to define some 
key terms employed in the remainder of this work. The basic unit of 
analysis vis-à-vis the binary is that of the “juridical subject.”30 In its 
most basic form, a juridical subject is a doctrinal entity “endowed with 
juridical personality who [is] usually known as a collective person, 
social person, or legal entity.”31 A subject has rights and obligations 
under law, and may qualify for judicial protections if the courts find that 
a subject falls within a specified legal classification, e.g., “discrete and 
insular minority.”32  A “legal identity” is comprised of the space within 
which the subject and the law interact; it is an identity that is conferred 
upon the subject by law, e.g., race and ethnicity as legal classifications 
that entitle a subject to claim the protections of identity-based 
legislation.33 Lastly, a “non-binary identity” is one in which the subject 
                                                 
30 As used in this work, “subject” is shorthand for juridical subject. 
31 Elvia Arcelia Quintana Adriano, The Natural Person, Legal Entity or Juridical 
Person and Juridical Personality, 4 PENN. ST. J. OF L. & INT'L AFF. 363, 366 (2015). 
“The elements that contribute to the formation of a legal person are the following:  
 Existence of a being or subject: A subject of law is any being capable to 
act as holder of powers, or liable with obligations in a juridical relationship. 
The term subject of law or juridical being alludes to an unspecified person 
in terms of strict law.  
 Will of the subject or being. The action of a subject with the intention of 
producing certain legal effects, and should be highlighted its importance for 
the law, since this will should be also expressed in an appropriate manner to 
produce legal consequences.  
 Subjective rights. This refers to the power of the juridical norms which is 
granted to express or omit certain conduct that ensures the judicial 
protection  
 Juridical personality . . .   
 Obligations. The obligation is understood as the existing juridical bond 
between the demand of a subjective right by its holder and the duty to fulfill 
the conduct based on the norm that is imposed on the other subject who 
belongs to the relationship … In the juridical field, the word personality has 
several meanings. It is often used to indicate the quality of a person to be 
considered as a center of juridical norms or as a subject of rights and 
obligations.” Id. at 375–76. 
32 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 155 n.4 (1938). 
33 See, e.g., Village of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 607 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(holding that, under federal law, “Hispanic” qualifies as a “race” when determining 
if a plaintiff can be afforded protection from discrimination under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964). More specifically, the Second Circuit considered the 
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is not encased within a clear biaxial This/That classification, category, 
or structure.34 A subject is therefore not immured in a racial, ethnic, sex, 
gender, or other identity category that is fundamentally binary-based.  
Legal identity lays out the relationship between the State and the 
juridical subject.35 From the founding, when various human beings were 
not fully recognized as human in the fundamental law as expounded 
upon in the initial U.S. Constitution—such as African slaves, Native 
Americans, women, and children—to the post-Civil War era, and 
continuing through to the present, identity has played a key role in the 
evolution of the law and its relationship to those it ostensibly serves.36 
In the present time, however, it seems that there are major developments 
occurring on the domestic sociocultural and political stages which are 
premised on either substantially modifying, e.g., the inclusion of the 
LGBTQ identity group into the traditional heterosexual-based 
Male/Female marriage institution,37 or eradiating, e.g., the notion of our 
society being at the threshold of moving beyond He/She,38 the 
                                                 
question of whether or not “Hispanic” constitutes a racial category when interpreting 
Title VII Id. at 606–07. The court, relying on the interpretation that ethnicity is a 
race for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and held that the same should hold true for 
purposes of Title VII. Id. at 607. See Scott B. Astrada & Marvin L. Astrada, Being 
Latino in the 21st Century: Reexamining Politicized Identity & the Problem of 
Representation, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 247–48 (2017).  
34 See, e.g., Karen Kopelson, Dis/Integrating the Gay/Queer Binary: ‘Reconstructed 
Identity Politics’ for a Performative Pedagogy, 65 COLLEGE ENGLISH 17, 28 (2002). 
35 See, e.g., The Combahee River Collective, Combahee River Collective: A Black 
Feminist Statement, 9 OFF OUR BACKS INC. 6, 6–8 (1979). 
36 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(prohibiting racial segregation of public schools); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 
(1962) (prohibiting racial segregation of interstate and intrastate transportation 
facilities); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that state laws prohibiting 
inter-racial marriage are unconstitutional); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 392 U.S. 
409 (1968) (holding that federal law bars all racial discrimination (private or public) 
in the sale or rental of property); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (finding that a 
city school system's failure to provide English language instruction to students of 
Chinese ancestry amounted to unlawful discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of. 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that a public university may take race 
into account as a factor in admissions decisions); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986) (finding that a state denies Black defendants equal protection when members 
of his/her race have been purposefully excluded from a jury).  
37 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
38 See Katy Steinmetz, Beyond 'He' or 'She', TIME (Mar. 16, 2017), 
http://time.com/4703058/time-cover-story-beyond-he-or-she/ (“In state legislatures, 
lawmakers are . . . debating the very meaning of the words sex and gender in debates 
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traditional binary basis upon which legal identity has been premised.39 
This especially seems to be the case since the emergence of the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, itself premised on the 
integrity of a binary racial identity signifier (Black, the antithesis of its 
polar opposite, White).40   
Many aspects of a subject’s social and legal reality—rights, 
freedoms, responsibilities, duties, and obligations—are directly 
impacted when courts interpret identity-based legislation, broadly 
construed.41 Law, in the form of judicial interpretation, has been 
employed to recognize and confer legal status, protections, and benefits 
upon those who fall within certain identity-based group 
classifications.42 Race, ethnicity, and sexuality are exemplars of 
identity-based signifiers that manifest in the law.43 The law is able to 
recognize and infuse such signifiers with substantive benefits and 
protections.44 Examples would be affirmative action programs designed 
to remedy past racial discrimination and the designation of racially 
motivated criminal conduct as felonious.45 These programs and laws 
exist because identity-signifiers, at the most basic level, are ostensibly 
based on and rooted in a binary opposition.46 That is, each of the 
                                                 
over so-called ‘bathroom bills.’ Lawsuits alleging that sexual orientation and gender 
identity are covered under bans on sex discrimination are fleshing out the meaning of 
that word too. But it is clear that for many people these binaries are bedrocks they 
will fight to defend.”). 
39 See generally David Taylor, Social Identity and Social Policy: Engagements with 
Postmodern Theory, 27 J. SOC. POL’Y. 329 (1998) (arguing for the importance of the 
concept of social identity in contemporary analyses of social policy). 
40 Roy L. Brooks & Kirsten Widner, In Defense of the Black/White Binary: 
Reclaiming a Tradition of Civil Rights Scholarship, 12 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & 
POL'Y 107, 117–18 (2010). 
41 See Taylor, supra note 39. 
42 See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (finding that racial segregation 
of interstate or intrastate transportation facilities is a litigable issue); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor's use of peremptory 
challenge in a criminal case dismissing jurors without stating a valid cause for doing 
so may not be used to exclude jurors based solely on their race). 
43 See generally KATHERINE J. ROSICH, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM (Am. Soc. Ass’n ed., 2007) (discussing racial and ethnic 
disparities in the criminal justice system). 
44 Id. 
45 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 42. 
46 See, e.g., Fisher v. U. of Tex. (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (holding that the 
lower court had not applied the standard of strict scrutiny, articulated in Grutter v. 
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foregoing signifiers is correlated to a specific identity group that exists, 
in part, by virtue of shared experiences and traits that devolve from 
being paired with an opposite. Prominent binaries that the law has 
employed and concretized in legal discourse include Black/White, 
Heterosexual/Homosexual, and Male/Female, to name a few.47 These 
are some basic binaries that, though they have been complicated by 
efforts to broaden the scope of inclusion or clarify the nuances of sub-
identities that are subsumed by the basic binary, continue to provide the 
judicial expositors of law with a primary basis for the administration of 
justice. 
In light of recent history, from the late 1960s through the 
present, especially with the establishment of modern politicized identity 
groups challenging the power dynamics and composition of the 
traditional identity binary, it seemed that the basic identity binary, 
because of its simplicity and distortionary effects, was on its way to 
becoming an outdated construct. One of the most radical challenges to 
the binary notion of oppression and revolt, for instance, was the 
Combahee River Collective, a Black feminist lesbian organization 
active in Boston from 1974 to 1980.48 The Collective articulated a 
viable sub-identity within the mainstream feminist movement, which 
was comprised primarily of white women, and based, in large part, on 
Male/Female, White/Black, and Heterosexual/Homosexual identity 
                                                 
Bollinger and Regents of the U. of Cal. v. Bakke, to its admissions program. The 
Court's ruling in Fisher I took Grutter and Bakke as given and did not directly revisit 
the constitutionality of using race as a factor in college admissions); Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (holding that a state may punish offenders more 
harshly when considering whether a crime was committed or initially considered due 
to an intended victim's status in a protected class). 
47 There are numerous examples of the Court’s use of binary-based identity as a 
basis for articulating and adjudicating identity-based cases. See, e.g., Tennessee v. 
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004) (expounding on the able-bodied/disabled 
dichotomy); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973) (detailing 
historical sex-based distinctions memorialized in the Court’s jurisprudence such as 
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 142 (1873)). It should also be noted that, while the 
binary provides the super-structure of the juridical enterprise—Guilty/Not Guilty in 
criminal adjudication, for instance—we are very much aware that variegated 
permutations have emerged and that the binary is far more complex in actuality than 
a purely biaxial framework upon which law, politics, and public policy are based.  
48 See Wini Breines, What’s Love Got to Do with It? White Women, Black Women, 
and Feminism in the Movement Years, 27 J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 
1095, 1095–96 (2002) (discussing the importance of the Combahee River Statement 
in Black feminism). 
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binaries.49 Although challenges to and rejection of traditional binary-
based identity signifiers persist in the 21st century, the binary has proven 
quite resilient.  
Certain indicators point to a trend toward rejecting basic identity 
binaries and signifiers. Specifically, millennials tend to reject traditional 
basic identity binaries, especially in the realms of gender, sexuality, and 
race/ethnicity.50 Similarly, there are calls for minorities (and sub-groups 
within minorities) to be distinguished from an overarching umbrella 
identity and receive equal treatment under law as far as legal benefits 
and protections are concerned.51 Macro- and micro-scale resistance in 
the form of rejecting gender and sexuality identities—blurring the lines 
between and among identities, as well as rejecting pronouns that reflect 
a basic binary, e.g., replacing Latino/Latina with LatinX52—seem to be 
indicative of a trend wherein basic identity-signifiers are being 
discarded for alternative formulations of identity.53 Identities once 
considered viable and concrete in the recent past, such as sexuality, 
gender, race, and ethnicity, seem to be quite fluid, and perhaps not 
                                                 
49 The Combahee River Collective, Combahee River Collective: A Black Feminist 
Statement, 9 OFF OUR BACKS INC. 6, 6–8 (1979). 
50 Jacqueline J. Kacen, Girrrl Power and Boyyy Nature: The Past, Present, and 
Paradisal Future of Consumer Gender Identity, 18 MKTG. INTELLIGENCE & PLAN. 
345, 345–46 (2000); PEW RES. CENTER, MILLENNIALS: CONFIDENT. CONNECTED. 
OPEN TO CHANGE (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-connected-
open-to-change.pdf. 
51 See Marjua Estevez, Can Afro-Latinos Please Move Beyond The “I’m Black, Too” 
Rhetoric?, VIBE (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.vibe.com/2016/11/afro-latinos-beyond-
im-black-too/. 
52 Vanessa Reyes, More Than Just an Image: Pop Culture Representations of 
Latinxs and the Immigration Debate, AUGUSTANA DIGITAL COMMONS (Feb. 18, 
2015), http://digitalcommons.augustana.edu/mabryaward/1/. 
53 See generally JUDITH S. KAUFMAN & DAVID A. POWELL, The Meaning of Sexual 
Identity in the Twenty-First Century, in THE MEANING OF SEXUAL IDENTITY IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Judith S. Kaufman & David A. Powell eds., 2014); Darryl 
Fears, Rejecting Race as an Identity, LA TIMES (Apr. 23, 1999), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/apr/23/news/mn-30243; Karen L. Suvemoto, 
Redefining “Asian American” Identity: Reflections on Differentiating Ethnic and 
Racial Identities for Asian American Individuals and Communities, in ASIAN 
AMERICANS: VULNERABLE POPULATIONS, MODEL INTERVENTIONS, AND CLARIFYING 
AGENDAS 115–26 (Lin Zhan ed., 2002). 
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amenable to the present sociocultural and political actuality as we head 
into the mid-21st century.54  
The recent election, however, seems to challenge this trend, and 
can be viewed as an attempt by the Administration to pander to and base 
public policy on select identity groups’ interests, such as White working 
class and White rural Americans, that have been based on the integrity 
of binary-based identity signifiers.55 Basic identity-based signifiers 
such as Pro (Patriot)/Anti-American, White/Non-White, Citizen/Non-
Citizen, and Self-reliant/Welfare recipient,56 seem to be at the heart of 
the present Administration’s sociopolitical, sociocultural, and economic 
agendas.57  
 
B. Law, Binaries, and the Administration of Justice 
 
In addition to the political and public policy realms, the law, in 
particular, has relied upon identity binaries in fashioning legal tools. For 
example, the federal judiciary uses them to assess race-based 
                                                 
54 Supra notes 50–53. 
55 See Rich Morin, Behind Trump’s Win in Rural White America: Women Joined 
Men in Backing Him, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 17, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/17/behind-trumps-win-in-rural-
white-america-women-joined-men-in-backing-him/. 
56 President Trump recently stated: “I just don’t want a poor person” in the 
billionaire-laden cabinet. “‘Somebody said, ‘Why’d you appoint rich person to be in 
charge of the economy,’ said Trump, a billionaire himself. ‘I said, ‘Because that’s 
the kind of thinking we want.’” “‘They’re representing the country. They don’t want 
the money. They’re representing the country. They had to give up a lot to take these 
jobs. They gave up a lot,’ he said.” Eugene Scott, Trump: ‘I Just Don't Want a Poor 
Person’ in Cabinet Economic Jobs, CNN (June 22, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/22/politics/donald-trump-poor-person-
cabinet/index.html.  
57 The Trump Administration has tried to push national security-based travel bans 
and border wall policies explicitly premised on politicized identity as well as 
socioeconomic policies premised on particular politicized identity groups. See, e.g., 
Exec. Order No. 13788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 18, 2017) (Exec. Order on Buy 
American and Hire American); Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 
2017) (Exec. Order on The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United 
States); Exec. Order No. 13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815 (Apr. 28, 2017) (Exec. Order 
Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy); Traci Tong, Will the 
Travel Ban and Building a Wall Fix America's Immigration Problems?, PRI’S THE 
WORLD (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-03-07/will-travel-ban-and-
building-wall-fix-americas-immigration-problems. 
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preferential programs in education and employment,58 and applies strict 
scrutiny to race-based litigation to adjudicate claims based on identity.59 
These developments have been viewed, generally speaking, positively, 
and reflect a strategy of inclusion of the Other that can be traced back 
to the NAACP’s use of the federal courts to recognize and reify a 
distinctly racial (Black contrasted with White) American identity that 
the law was required to recognize and protect.60 Identities, especially 
those premised on basic binary signifiers such as Black/White, 
Equal/Unequal, and Segregated/Integrated, resulted in the law being 
able to fashion legal tools and remedies to identify and protect those 
who belonged to legally cognizable and protected groups.61  
Yet, it seems that identities in the present have become more 
complex, fragmented, disparate, and expansively inclusive—to the 
point where the idea of identity may have become overly porous, easily 
breached, or so nuanced with sub-identities that the initial basic binary 
loses its integrity, coherency, and fails to provide clear criteria for 
defining any discernable identity.62 Perhaps the most prevalent problem 
with legally redefining identity is defining it in a way that will withstand 
                                                 
58 The Court has declared that race-based affirmative action programs, “imposed by 
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a 
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200 (1995); see also Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that 
affirmative action programs are only permitted when there is a showing that the 
program’s aim is to eliminate effects of past discrimination). 
59 See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int’l. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 474 
(1986) (“The purpose of affirmative action is . . . to dismantle prior patterns of 
employment discrimination and to prevent discrimination in the future.”). 
60 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State 
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
61 This is a practice with a long history. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) 
(holding unanimously that a Louisville, Ky. city ordinance, prohibiting the sale of 
real property to blacks in white-majority neighborhoods or buildings and vice versa, 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's protections for freedom (liberty) of contract). 
62 An extreme example of this phenomenon is the case of Rachel Dolezal, a racially 
white woman who claims to be trans-racial, and for whom, it appears, Black and 
Blackness are not socially constructed states of affairs premised on empirical 
experience and physical traits but which possess an immanent realness, substance, 
that defies the binary logic of the traditional Black/White or White/Other racial 
binaries. Chris McGreal, Rachel Dolezal: “I wasn't identifying as black to upset 
people. I was being me,” THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/13/rachel-dolezal-i-wasnt-
identifying-as-black-to-upset-people-i-was-being-me. 
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the test of time. Justice Traynor’s opinion in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,63 which addresses the difficulty 
in assigning a singular meaning to a particular word, can also be applied 
to the inherent problem in attempting to fix concepts and designations: 
 
If words had absolute and constant references, it might be 
possible to discover . . . intention in the words themselves and 
in the manner in which they were arranged. Words, however, do 
not have absolute and constant referents . . . The meaning of 
particular words or groups of words varies with the . . . “verbal 
context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of 
the linguistic education and experience of their users and their 
hearers or readers (not excluding judges) . . . A word has no 
meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an 
objective meaning, one true meaning.64 
  
Law, and the courts interpreting the law, have traditionally 
relied upon oversimplified, politicized identity-binaries that inform 
identity-signifiers.65 This is significant because, as a celebrated observer 
of American politics has noted,  
 
[s]carcely any question arises in the United States that does not 
become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate; hence all 
parties are obliged to borrow, in their daily controversies, the 
ideas, and even the language, usual in judicial proceedings . . . . 
The language of the law thus becomes, in some measure, a 
vulgar tongue; the spirit of the law, which is produced in . . . the 
courts of justice, gradually penetrates beyond their walls into the 
                                                 
63 442 P.2d 641 (1968). 
64 Id. at 644–45 (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the 
Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 (1965)). 
65 See DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS 14–15 (2d ed. 2007) (“Focusing 
on linguistic signs (such as words), Saussure defined a sign as being composed of a 
‘signifier’ (signifiant) and a ‘signified’ (signifié). Contemporary commentators tend 
to describe the signifier as the form that the sign takes and the signified as the 
concept to which it refers.”). An identity signifier is thus comprised of a signifier, 
e.g., Black, Gay, or Latino, and a signified concept, e.g., Racial, Sexual, or Ethnic 
Identity. 
Astrada & Astrada 
2018]   REEXAMINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE BINARY 187 
 
bosom of society, . . . so that at last the whole people contracts 
the habits and the tastes of the judicial magistrate.66 
 
The parallel contexts, legal and social, exist alongside each 
other, continuously influencing and acting upon each other.67 As a 
result, some sub-identities that have not been integrated are subjugated, 
and exist on the periphery of the binary, while others are in essence 
silenced because they are unable to be expressed in the dominant 
context.68 The binary nature of identity, which includes the political and 
the legal, establishes what Michel Foucault has termed “grids of 
specification,” which he defines as “the systems according to which the 
different ‘kinds of [knowledge] are divided, contrasted, related, 
regrouped, classified, derived from one another as objects of … 
discourse.’”69 Identity emerges within these grids, which we conceive 
of as binaries. These binaries delineate and make “real” the abstract 
space in which the law processes identity-based cases and 
controversies.70 The federal courts’ racial and civil rights jurisprudence, 
such as gauging the constitutionality of affirmative action programs in 
higher education, is a prime example of this space.71 
The binary nature of the legal subject limits how one can define 
one’s self in lived social experience.72 The essential “tradeoff” between 
the efficiency of the binary and its inclusive nature, is that the law, in 
                                                 
66 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 301–02 (Henry Reeve 
trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1904). 
67 See, e.g., Megan Davidson, Seeking Refuge Under the Umbrella: Inclusion, 
Exclusion, and Organizing Within the Category Transgender, 4 SEXUALITY RES. 
AND SOC. POL’Y 60, 75 (2007). 
68 Id. 
69 MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 42 (1982). “[G]rids of 
specification: these are the systems according to which the different 'kinds of 
[knowledge] are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one 
another as objects of . . . discourse.” Id.  
70 Id. 
71 See David L. Gregory & Sarah Mannix, Past as Prologue in the Affirmative Action 
Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court: Reflections on Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin and Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 89 ST. JOHN'S L. 
REV. 499, 546 (2015). 
72 See The Trouble With Diversity: An Argument Between Walter Benn Michaels And 
Katha Pollitt. Scott Stossel Moderates. The Atlantic Day of Ideas, N. Y. Public 
Library, South Court Auditorium, LIVE FROM THE NYPL (Nov. 18, 2006), 
http://www.newyorkpubliclibrary.com/sites/default/files/events/diversity111806.pdf. 
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its limitation of perceiving juridical subjects in binary terms, cannot 
give a voice to subjects that exist, socially, outside a traditional binary 
structure.73 Here is the crux of what Jean F. Lyotard labels “the 
differend,” that is,  
 
the case where the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and 
becomes for that reason a victim. If the addressor, the addressee, 
and the sense of the testimony are neutralized, everything takes 
place as if there were no damages [ ]. A case of differend 
between two parties takes place when the ‘regulation’ of the 
conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the 
parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in 
that idiom.74  
 
This silence is precisely what is at stake when the law cannot effectively 
“hear” a subject. The law does not oppress the non-binary subject, so 
much as it does not empower it to verbalize its needs and interests.75 
The language of the non-binary exists outside the “establishment 
procedure,”76 and thus becomes only silence. The experience of a 
subject that is divested of speech as a result of not speaking the language 
of the law is of particular interest because the lived experience is 
bifurcated between the law that imposes an ulterior identity onto the 
subject, one that is un-relatable, and a lived experience that substantially 
differs from that identity.77 
 
 
II. THE POLITICIZED AND BINARY-BASED NATURE OF IDENTITY IN 
LAW 
 
This section discusses the politicized nature of binary-based 
identity and its relationship to the binary in the law. Politicized identity 
is premised on a basic binary basis.78 Formal identity-based groups such 
as the National Council of La Raza or the NAACP create, to some 
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE 9 (GeorgesVan 
Den Abbeele, trans., Univ. Minn. Press 1988) (1983). 
75 Id. at 10. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See Mary Bernstein, Identity Politics, 31 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 47, 56, 62 (2005). 
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extent, exclusive political enclaves based on a shared racial or ethnic 
history, traits, and/or culture, that are defined vis-à-vis an Other.  
Politicized identity, itself a creature of history and culture, though 
distinct from legal identity, has been utilized by the courts to adjudicate 
cases and controversies that hinge on identity classifications.79 The 
question is not whether there is disconnect between identity based on 
lived experience and legal identity, but rather how radical the break is 
between the two. Turning to the question of how one experiences social 
identity, it is useful to draw from Martin Heidegger’s essay concerned 
with how one “dwells”80 as a subject. Applying this framework to 
understand how a subject experiences its politicized identity, and how 
that identity manifests in the law, provides additional insight into our 
inquiry. This section thus examines how the binary informs the present 
politics of identity, and how traditional binary-based identity signifiers 
continue to provide a framework for and insight into how identity and 
history impact dwelling in the present age. 
 In the context of exploring a subject’s lived experience outside 
of a juridical structure, Heidegger’s analysis of “dwelling”81 is 
particularly pertinent. The central question of dwelling is how a subject 
manifests in law and policy within a continuously evolving 
sociocultural and historical context.82 Dwelling is, to a large extent, 
sociocultural and historical in nature, and the foregoing actively shape 
the dwelling space within which a subject is defined, and sets the limits 
and possibilities of a subject’s perception and interpretation.83 For 
example, the idea of race, especially the legal definition of who is Black 
or Hispanic, emerges throughout various historical contexts—religious 
notions of race to scientific notions that have given way to a primarily 
sociocultural definition of race.84 The various structural components of 
identity, e.g., culture, race, ethnicity, gender, ideology, and geography, 
                                                 
79 Id. 
80 See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Building Dwelling Thinking, in POETRY, LANGUAGE, 
THOUGHT 141–60 (Albert Hofstadter, trans., 1971).  
81 Id. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
84 See Bernstein, supra note 78. 
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are all inextricably linked as the background, the dwelling, from which 
a subject emerges and resides in.85   
Ultimately, a subject dwells within its culture, which provides a 
behavioral system for a subject to interpret and define the world. Culture 
is the qualitative basis for the variability explaining how subjects dwell 
in an identity space, and how judges arrive at very different 
interpretations of the law. Culture lays the foundation for action, 
conduct, strategies, and thought, which finds ultimate expression in 
policy.86 In the case of identity-based cases and controversies, the courts 
have approached various identity-based statuses, such as race, ethnicity, 
and national origin, from a cultural lens; the constitutional and legal 
reasoning employed and conclusions reached are tinctured with a 
culturally informed binary.87 Culture can be conceived as a conceptual 
catalogue that catalogues possible interpretations of an experience, and 
political culture as a subset that itemizes the political dimension of 
experience.88 Depending on the cultural legacy inherited by a particular 
society, social subjects will have an inventory of possible courses of 
action from which to choose.89 The inventory of options contributes to 
identity, to what someone is or is not.90 Groups and individuals grasp 
and comprehend their “essence,” distinctive identity, by identifying 
                                                 
85 See Paul Harrison, “How shall I say it…?” Relating the Non-Relational, 39 ENV’T 
AND PLAN. 590, 595 (2007) (discussing the elements of the self in relation to 
suffering). 
86 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a state statutory 
scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial 
classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (holding 
that a prosecutor's peremptory challenges of Latino jurors based on doubts about the 
ability of such jurors to defer to official interpreter’s translation of Spanish-language 
testimony did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 
U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (holding that an equal protection of the laws is not directed 
solely against discrimination between whites and blacks; exclusion of eligible 
persons from jury service solely because of their ancestry or national origin is 
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
87 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 86. 
88 See generally Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self: 
Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224  
(1991) (discussing how the view of self is influenced by culture). 
89 Id. at 228. 
90 See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, BASIC WRITINGS (Barry Stocker ed., 2007) 
(providing select translations of Derrida’s seminal works on deconstruction). 
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what they are not.91 Culture thus consists of what Clifford Geertz dubs 
socially constructed “structures of meaning”92 that mediate the terms 
that subjects of a polity utilize to situate, organize, and define 
relationships between space, place, and identity.93 Knowledge is 
effectively transmitted spatially, temporally, via a cultural 
superstructure.94 Culture thus effectively constrains rationality, so as to 
produce variegated sub-sets of perception and interest articulation in the 
realm of identity politics and law.95  
The binary is so pervasive that it structures meta-discourse and 
narratives across various dimensions, e.g., identity, ideology, and 
politics.96 The binary has been effective in providing the courts with a 
mechanism by which to effectively adjudicate cases and controversies 
that are identity-based. “[B]inaries serve as crucial legitimating 
reference points in the vocabulary”97 of the courts in positing law that 
then informs and delineates policy. Court opinions, the textual products 
of interpretation, provide such reference points. The Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution—from Plessy98 to Brown99 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 12–13 
(1973). 
93 Id. 
94 See generally RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND MATERIALISM (rev. ed. 2006) 
(examining the role of power structures in setting culture and disseminating ideas).   
95 See Michael Walzer, On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought, 82 POL. 
SCI. Q. 191, 194 (1967); SUSANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY (3d ed. 
1957) (describing the interrelationship between cultural norms and expressions and 
perceptions of reality). 
96 See, e.g., Karen A. Cerulo, Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions, 23 
ANN. REV. OF SOC. 385 (1997) (discussing the shift from the “me” focus to a 
context-based analysis in sociological research); Nancy Leong, Identity 
Entrepreneurs, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1333 (2016) (discussing how individuals derive 
value form association with various binary groups).  
97 Cyrus Tata, Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the 
Discretionary Decision Process, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 425, 448 (2007). 
98 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that separate but equal facilities 
did not violate the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments). 
99 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturned Plessy v. 
Ferguson holding that separate educational facilities are not equal). 
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(White/Black binary), Hardwick100 to Lawrence101 
(Heterosexual/Homosexual binary), for instance—is a manner of 
initiating “new” conceptual frameworks for comprehending legal 
actuality. The aforementioned opinions are exemplars of judicial 
opinions as a form of policy, and how opinions can retain high degrees 
of continuity but can also accommodate “change” vis-à-vis 
circumstances. Applying a cultural lens to identity, law, and policy 
better equips one to identify and gauge the influence of the varied 
cognitive maps that anchor and encapsulate thought and possibility, as 
utilized by interpreters such as Judge Thompson in her dissent in 
Kosilek.102  
Court opinions, as expositions of truth, are, among other things, 
interpretations that seek to provide answers that are “part of a much 
larger network or system of questions and answers and further questions 
instead of being merely discrete self-contained units of information.”103 
Behavior does not take place in a vacuum; in the case of interpretation, 
culture exerts a gravitational pull, so to speak, on the interminable ebb 
and flow of the meaning of identity in the law.104 Identity (and policy) 
not only reflects the values, norms, content, and character of the 
interpreter, but more importantly the cultural superstructure that 
informs policy.105 Court opinions establish a corpus of truth, a regime 
of truth based on knowledge that the courts apply and obtain through 
the interpretive process.106 Opinions constitute a textual and ideational 
structure upon which meaning is produced and produces.107 Culture 
serves to define, anchor, legitimate, and contextualize interpretation. 
                                                 
100 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (overturning the lower court’s decision 
and holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
protect homosexual sex even in the privacy of one’s bedroom). 
101 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick 
holding that the court should not criminalize acts in relationships outside of injury or 
abuse). 
102 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (arguing that deference was due 
to the district court judge in a case concerning the denial of sex reassignment surgery 
to an inmate). 
103 DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, OBLIVION 131 (2004). See also J. B. Ruhl, Law's 
Complexity: A Primer, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885, 888 (2008). 
104 Ruhl, supra note 103, at 888.  
105 See id. 
106 See, e.g., Jessica Knouse, From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 2009 UTAH 
L. REV. 749, 750 (2009). 
107 Id. 
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Interpretation and resultant policy are emplaced within culture, and are, 
among other things, expressions of the cultural orientations of an elite 
that exercises power in the legal context.108 Culture has explanatory 
power when analyzing law and policy because it encompasses a 
“‘complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, 
Custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society’ . . . [C]ulture . . . manifest[s] in customs, in beliefs, 
and in forms of government.’”109 It is in this context that culture is the 
foundation that grounds the binary structure, while also privileging one 
term over the other (e.g., White/Black, Male/Female).110 
 
III. THE INTEGRATED BINARY: LEGAL DISCOURSE, IDENTITY, AND 
THE JURIDICAL SUBJECT 
 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270–71 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding a 
district court ruling that an employer's policy requiring employees to speak English 
only while at work did not violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibition against 
national origin discrimination). A “person who speaks only one tongue or to a person 
who has difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home, language 
might well be an immutable characteristic like skin color, sex or place of birth. 
However, the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular 
time is by definition a matter of choice . . . We do not consider rules that turn on the 
language used in an employee's home, the one he chooses to speak when not at work 
or the tongue spoken by his parents or grandparents. In some circumstances, the 
ability to speak or the speaking of a language other than English might be equated 
with national origin, but this case concerns only a requirement that persons capable 
of speaking English do so while on duty. That this rule prevents some employees, 
like Mr. Garcia, from exercising a preference to converse in Spanish does not 
convert it into discrimination based on national origin. Reduced to its simplest, the 
claim is ‘others like to speak English on the job and do so without penalty. Speaking 
Spanish is very important to me and is inherent in my ancestral national origin. 
Therefore, I should be permitted to speak it and the denial to me of that preference so 
important to my self-identity is statutorily forbidden.’ The argument thus reduces 
itself to a contention that the statute commands employers to permit employees to 
speak the tongue they prefer. We do not think the statute permits that interpretation, 
whether the preference be slight or strong or even one closely related to self-identity. 
Mr. Garcia and the EEOC would have us adopt a standard that the employer's 
business needs must be accomplished in the manner that appears to us to be the least 
restrictive. The statute does not give the judiciary such latitude in the absence of 
discrimination.” Id. 
109 Robert C. Tucker, Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society, 88 POL. 
SCI. Q. 173, 173 (1973) (internal citation omitted). 
110 Id. 
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A. Carolene Products’ Footnote Four and Concretizing the 
Binary 
 
Binaries continue to shape the courts’ approach to identity.111 
To undermine traditional notions of a legal binary identity is to blur the 
lines between the present and the past—to recognize the historical 
subjectivity of one’s now and to destabilize the basis upon which an 
entire jurisprudence has been built.112 The Court’s Footnote Four in 
United States v. Carolene Products Co. is a vivid exemplar of law 
reflecting and reifying an historically based identity binary in the form 
of “discrete and insular minorities.”113 Such minorities, analytically and 
legally speaking, have pervaded the law; conceptually, they embody a 
legal-rational construct that permeates legal actuality as produced by 
court interpretation and opinions.114 The binary has thus been the basis 
of the most “progressive” innovations in law and policy emanating from 
the bench.115 In light of this, it seems paradoxical and problematic that 
the political and public policy realms are reflecting a rejection of the 
very basis that the law has employed to protect groups that have faced 
historical discrimination, violence, and exclusion from full and 
substantive participation in the polity.  
                                                 
111 See generally Julie A. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex 
Categories: A Comparison of the Multiracial and Transgendered Experience, 39 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917, 942 (2002) (discussing how the binaries present in race 
classifications systems can provide solutions for the current gender binaries). 
112 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (“[N]o judicial 
system could do society’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that it 
raised . . . the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution 
requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, 
indispensable.” (internal citations omitted)). 
113 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
114 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that “race-
based affirmative action programs, “imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”); 
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642–46 (1973) (holding that aliens are a 
discrete and insular minority and therefore a statute barring aliens public 
employment on basis of citizenship). 
115 See CARLOS BALL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUALITY, GENDER 
IDENTITY, AND THE LAW (6th ed. 2016); DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, 
RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES 14–15 (2003) (explaining the negative impact of the tendency to 
consider those with disabilities to be a homogenous class). 
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One of the most famous footnotes in United States Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, i.e., Footnote Four from Carolene Products,116 
captures the entrenchment of the binary. It is, in Justice Powell’s words, 
“the most celebrated footnote in constitutional law.”117 Although 
Footnote Four did not give rise to the binary nor mark the prominent 
moment when the Court embedded a binary framework into its 
jurisprudence,118 it does mark a very clear moment in time when the 
binary is explicitly articulated as being an integral part of the genesis of 
modern equal protection jurisprudence and clarifies the juridical subject 
in the context of Court interpretation.119 The Court ponders, in Footnote 
Four, “whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be 
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry.”120 Footnote Four becomes the self-referential basis 
upon which, among other things, the Court has based its tiered scrutiny 
framework, and adjudges the manner in which a right translates into a 
constitutional protection.121  
Although Footnote Four is multidimensional, it is important to 
keep in mind “the fact that the Carolene Products Footnote is about 
values.”122 The primary value that Footnote Four memorializes is that 
of the Court’s power to review legislation to further the protection of 
minority rights—minorities that are viewed in and derive protection 
from a basic binary basis.123 The binary is one that can be characterized 
                                                 
116 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
117 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “Carolene Products” Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 
1087 (1982). 
118 See e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) & Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 
536, 541 (1926) (using the Black/White binary to find that a party cannot exclude 
blacks from voting in its primary); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 
(1925) (Private/Public binary to hold that states cannot require children to attend 
public, rather than parochial, schools). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
401 (1923) (relying on a Citizen Nationalist/Alien Foreigner binary to find that states 
cannot forbid the teaching of a foreign language). 
119 See e.g., cases cited supra note 118.  
120 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
121 See Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of 
Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 CONST. 
COMMENT. 277, 283 (1995). 
122 Id. at 302. 
123 Id. at 284–85. 
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as positing “insiders” and “outsiders” within the law and, by 
implication, in the greater societal context.124 The identity-based binary 
is thus the fulcrum upon which courts are able to determine insider-
outsider status and to apply the law accordingly.125  
Granted, “discrete,” “insular,” and “minorities” are not 
explicitly defined, nor is it clear what kind of “prejudice” said 
“minorities”126 must be subject to trigger judicial protection. A 
reasonable interpretation of the terms, as used in the Footnote, is that 
the minority groups to whom it refers to  
 
are not able to play their proper role in democratic politics. They 
are “discrete” in the sense that they are separate in some way, 
identifiable as distinct from the rest of society. They are 
“insular” in the sense that other groups will not form coalitions 
with them—and, critically, not because of a lack of common 
interests but because of “prejudice.”127  
 
Various jurists and parties to lawsuits have construed Footnote 
Four to encompass sundry groups as “discrete and insular minorities” 
entitled to judicial protection.128 For example, relying upon Footnote 
                                                 
124 See. e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the Inside-Outsider, 
134 U. PA L. REV. 1291, 1293 (1986). 
125 See id. at 1316–19. 
126 See Dunnavant, supra note 23. 
127 David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 
1257 (2010). 
128 See, e.g., Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976) (arguing that illegitimate 
children were a suspect class and therefore classifications that disadvantaged them 
should be subject to strict scrutiny); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 
U.S. 432, 461–65 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that mentally retarded 
persons have been subjected to a long history of discrimination and should be 
viewed as a suspect class); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 144–45 (1971) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that legislative classifications that discriminate on 
the basis of poverty are “suspect” and demand “exacting judicial scrutiny”); 
Rowland v. Mad River Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1012–17 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting from denial of cert.) (arguing that homosexuals constitute a significant 
and insular minority of this country’s population, and that discrimination has in fact 
deprived this group of fundamental rights); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 
307, 313 (1976) (stating that “old age does not define a ‘discrete and insular’ 
group”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) 
(concluding that residents of poorer school districts were not “relegated to such a 
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Four in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,129 the Court held 
that 
 
when the State’s allocation of power places unusual burdens on 
the ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically 
designed to overcome the “special condition” of prejudice, the 
governmental action seriously “curtail[s] the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities.” In a most direct sense, this implicates the judiciary’s 
special role in safeguarding the interests of those groups that are 
“relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process.”130 
 
It seems, therefore, that binary-based identity has been key in the 
application of Footnote Four’s interpretative framework.  
A list of such physical/behavioral trait-based minorities 
“arguably includes not only groups defined in terms of race and national 
origin,” but also Sane/Mentally Ill, Rich/Poor, 
Heterosexual/Homosexual, and Adult/Child.131 The Carolene Products 
identity-based binary in Footnote Four utilizes and reaffirms the binary 
as the base of recognition, reasoning, interpretation, and adjudication.132 
When articulated in 1938, race was perhaps the clearest, preeminent 
binary-based identity signifier that the Court (and the lower federal and 
state courts) could emplace within Footnote Four’s interpretive 
architecture.133 In light of Reconstruction and the Post-Reconstruction 
South’s implementation of Jim Crow laws, the Black/White binary, 
which could readily be distilled from the historical experience of both 
races, fit into the “discrete and insular”134 criteria of Footnote Four, 
thereby triggering judicial scrutiny and protection. As construed by the 
Court, equal protection has been squarely built upon a binary-based 
                                                 
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process”). 
129 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982). 
130 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
131 Brilmayer, supra note 124, at 1295. 
132 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
133 Id. 
134 Brilmayer, supra note 124, at 1295. 
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edifice; the binary was and remains key to making sense of legal facts, 
the law, and its application.135    
 
B. Beyond Footnote Four 
  
 Footnote Four has become part of a larger legal meta-discourse 
on how the Court will view identity, generally speaking, and this of 
course impacts lower federal and state courts as well. The Court’s 
employment of binary-based identity signifiers is part of a long history 
of race-conscious legislation and judicial opinions.136 The modern 
manifestation of affirmative action, for instance, which began with the 
Philadelphia Plan137 in the late 1960s and has been the basis of racial 
identity-based cases such as Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,138 Metro 
                                                 
135 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory 
purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of 
consequences. It implies that the decision-maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a 
particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” (internal citation omitted)). 
136 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 118. 
137 See Nicholas Pedriana & Robin Stryker, Political Culture Wars 1960s Style: 
Equal Employment Opportunity–Affirmative Action Law and the Philadelphia Plan, 
103 AM. J. SOC. 633, 635 (1997). The 1969 Philadelphia Plan has been described as 
“‘the first effective use of affirmative action to implement civil rights legislation 
directing employers to guarantee equal employment opportunity.’ As the first highly 
visible federal government affirmative action initiative in the wake of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Philadelphia Plan crystallized arguments of both 
affirmative action’s early opponents and its early supporters. Just as past policies 
shaped how both sides crafted their arguments about the Philadelphia Plan, these 
arguments and their resolution fed forward to help shape later government 
employment policy.” Id. 
138 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (plurality 
opinion). 
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Broad. Inc. v. FCC,139 and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,140 is 
thoroughly steeped in binary-based identity. Binary-based identity has 
been the basis for articulating, examining, discussing, debating, 
arguing, and impassioned contestation over what constitutes 
correct/proper law and policy.141 It is an indispensable part of the 
legislative and interpretive process.  
In the case of the binary-based identity signifier, despite its 
simplification of complex reality, it has managed to remain a viable 
aspect of the legal enterprise in adjudicating cases and controversies 
because, despite the artificial nature of dyadic frameworks, as the Court 
noted long ago, “[c]ontroversies have arisen and will no doubt arise 
again in respect of the proper classification of individuals in border line 
cases.”142 Indeed, the binary has proven resilient in the face of 
progressive change, and has been (and can be) maintained to retain the 
status quo regarding identity-based signifiers. For example, in Gong 
Lum v. Rice,143 the Court, in affirming an example of segregation based 
on race, declared that 
 
[m]ost of the cases cited arose, it is true, over the establishment 
of separate schools as between white pupils and black pupils; 
                                                 
139 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552–53 (1990), overruled by Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995). Justice Brennan’s majority 
opinion declared: “We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by 
Congress—even if those measures are not 'remedial' in the sense of being designed 
to compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination—are 
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important governmental 
objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement 
of those objectives.” Id. at 564–65. For an example of gender and its binary nature, 
see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”).  
140 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (analyzing 
Title VII, the Court declared that, it “would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a 
Nation’s concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of 
those who had ‘been excluded from the American dream for so long’ constituted the 
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish 
traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.”). 
141 See, e.g., Greta Fowler Snyder, Multivalent Recognition: Between Fixity and 
Fluidity in Identity Politics, 74 THE J. OF POL. 249, 251 (2012); Rogers Brubaker & 
Frederick Cooper, Beyond “Identity,” 29 THEORY & SOC. 1, 3 (2000). 
142 Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922). 
143 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
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but we cannot think that the question [of the legality of 
segregation] is any different, or that any different result can be 
reached, assuming the cases above cited to be rightly decided, 
where the issue is as between white pupils and the pupils of the 
yellow races.144 
 
Courts that have construed the law to step significantly outside 
of the traditional identity-based binaries have been met with resistance. 
In the case of Kosilek v. Spencer,145 discussed supra, its reversal by the 
First Circuit146 could be recast in terms of protecting and reifying the 
sex/gender binary that is essential to the continuity that has undergirded 
how the law conceives and interprets legal protections for identity 
groups, especially “discrete and insular minorities.”147 The tension and 
dissonance between the district court’s legal reasoning and conclusions 
and the appellate court’s reasoning and conclusions may point to the 
“collective anxiety in our culture surrounding gender, and anyone who 
may bring light to the inadequacy of the gender binary, by blurring the 
lines between ‘male’ and ‘female.’”148 Judge Thompson, in her dissent 
also directly confronts the conflict between the integrity of the binary 
and challenges to its usage in grounding the law’s approach to identity-
based signifiers and the judicial provision of remedies and 
protections.149 Judge Thompson contends that the majority’s opinion 
“aggrieves an already marginalized community, and enables 
correctional systems to further postpone their adjustment to the 
crumbling gender binary.”150 In the case of the sex/gender binary:  
 
It is widely accepted in the dominant culture that there are two 
sexes and two genders and no room for anything in between. We 
organize our daily interactions, our values, our social 
institutions, the law, our very understanding of reality, around 
these assumptions. One is not fully cognizable as human without 
a designation as male or female. The categories of sex and 
gender and the differences we ascribe to them are legitimized 
                                                 
144 Id. at 87. 
145 See supra note 24. 
146 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). 
147 Id. 
148 Dunnavant, supra note 23, at 18. 
149 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96-113 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
150 Id. at 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
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through naturalizing them, insisting that they are based on real, 
inevitable differences and thus go unquestioned. Yet as gender 
theorists have long known, this binary system is not natural, but 
socially and politically constructed.151 
 
Kosilek v. Spencer points to the contest that is taking place in the realms 
of law and policy between time-tested binaries and the stability and 
“objective” basis they provide vis-à-vis identity signifiers.152 The case 
exemplifies the challenges based on fluidity and inclusiveness that the 
binary eschews by its dyadic nature of making complex states of affairs 
more manageable for the purpose of pragmatic and prudential 
management of the administration of justice.153 
When moving beyond the binary, certain subjects and groups 
may experience serious cognitive dissonance as to what is believed 
about the world and one’s place in it—as well as conceptions of Self, 
Other, and World.154 What defines the ethos and essence of what it 
means to be and why, may also be called into question for those same 
groups. With the introduction of alternative voices, interpretations, 
worldviews, and experiences, the simplified binary becomes subject to 
destabilization. When “one recognizes the emergence of multiple 
different voices—including … feminist, critical race, and more 
recently, gay and lesbian theorists—then modernist claims to identify 
                                                 
151 Dunnavant, supra note 23, at 20. See also JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: 
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 147 (1999) (discussing how the 
repeated naming of sexual differences creates the appearance of an organic sexuality 
regarding a binary of Male/Female). For a discussion of the relationship between 
sex, inter-sexed, and law and policy, see Sara R. Benson, Hacking The Gender 
Binary Myth: Recognizing Fundamental Rights For The Inter-Sexed, 12 CARDOZO 
J.L. & GENDER 31 (2005). 
152 See generally Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CAL. L. REV. 799 (2015) 
(identifying and describing the phenomenon of “formal identity,” in which the law 
recognizes those identities individuals claim for themselves by executing 
formalities); Clarissa R. Hayward & Ron Watson, Identity and Political Theory, 33 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y. 9 (2010) (discussing strong multiculturalism, liberal 
multiculturalism, and the Foucaultian view in identity politics). 
153 Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 63–96. 
154 See CHARLES TAYLOR, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: 
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25–51, 56–58, 60–73 (1994). 
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essential truths and ground knowledge on firm foundations become 
highly problematic.”155  
In the case of race, the basic binary that undergirds identity 
signifiers that the courts utilize to conceptualize and build a 
jurisprudential edifice that has, at its core, a racial dyad within which 
racial identity is ensconced, contours and delimits explanation and 
understanding of racial identity.156 The binary is significant because it 
provides an abridged and selective field of perception and interpretation 
that becomes the basis of what race is, what it means, and what will it 
encompass as far as legal reasoning and judicial resolution of cases and 
controversies that have an identity-basis upon which results depend.157 
The racial binary  
 
shapes our understanding of what race and racism mean and the 
nature of our discussions about race. It is crucial, therefore, to 
identify and describe [the binary] and to demonstrate how it 
binds and organizes racial discourse, limiting both the scope and 
the range of legitimate viewpoints in that discourse.”158 
 
In the context of racial identity and the binary framework within 
which it has been emplaced, the law has relied very heavily upon the 
Black/White identity signifier, to the point where other people of color 
such as Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans may (or appear to) drop 
out, and all that remains is an unadulterated Black/White binary for 
assessing redress and protections for the historically oppressed and 
exploited.159 Yet, other people of color and other groups deemed 
racially Other have suffered the same effects of race-based genocide 
(e.g., Native Americans), prejudice and discrimination in every aspect 
                                                 
155 STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO 
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 159 (2000). 
156 See cases cited infra notes 162–67. 
157 Id. 
158 Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” 
of American Racial Thought, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1213, 1214 (1998) [hereinafter Perea, 
The Black/White Binary]. 
159 See generally Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Embracing the Tar-Baby - 
LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 499 (2015) (reflecting 
on LatCrit theory and identifying submerged themes); Athena D. Mutua, Shifting 
Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the Black/White 
Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177 (1999) (reflecting on and critiquing LatCrit 
theory). 
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of their lives (e.g., Chinese), internment (e.g., Japanese), and prejudicial 
immigration polices (e.g., Irish, Latinos).160 Yet, the Black/White 
binary has been the basis of “landmark” legal opinions that have altered 
the fabric of law and policy in the 20th century.161 For example, a 
plethora of cases, from Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada,162 Sipuel v. 
Board of Regents,163 Sweatt v. Painter,164 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents,165 to Brown v. Board of Education,166 are premised 
exclusively on the Black/White binary.  
Each of the above cases, jointly and severally, has contributed 
to re-conceptualizing the law’s view of disparate treatment and the 
judicial role in protecting identity groups, generally speaking. Although 
the Court has applied judicial remedies and protections to other racial 
identity groups—such as the case of Hernandez v. Texas167 (wherein the 
Court held that Mexican-Americans and other nationality-based identity 
groups in the US were entitled to equal protection of the law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment)—the basic binary structure is still employed 
                                                 
160 See, e.g., DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1971) (documenting “a narrative of the conquest 
of the American west as the [Native Americans] experienced it.”);  
CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (exploring the Chinese-
American experience and use of the legal system to fight discrimination); ANDREA 
GEIGER, SUBVERTING EXCLUSION: TRANSPACIFIC ENCOUNTERS WITH RACE, CASTE, 
AND BORDERS, 1885-1928 (2015) (discussing Japanese and other Asian’s experience 
with immigration); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (2009) 
(discussing the historical events that lead to the Irish being considered white in the 
U.S.). 
161 Perea, The Black/White Binary, supra note 158, at 156. Struggles “over the legal 
status of Blacks have been central in shaping the Constitution and the Supreme 
Court's decisions on race and equality. All the civil rights enactments and court 
decisions deemed major in this area have sought to redress harms to Blacks. The 
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments abolished slavery and race discrimination in 
voting, respectively. The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment established 
federal and state citizenship for Blacks, reversing the Dred Scott decision. The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted principally to protect 
the civil equality of the newly freed slaves from hostile state action.” Id. at 155. 
162 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
163 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
164 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
165 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
166 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
167 347 U.S. 475 (1954).  
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in modified form, such as White/Non-White.168 The basic integrity of 
the binary is preserved and further utilized to make sense of and resolve 
legal cases and controversies that are identity-based in nature.  
In Hernandez, the Court declared that the “Fourteenth 
Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a ‘two-
class theory’—that is, based upon differences between ‘white’ and 
‘Negro.’”169 Describing some of the racial prejudice and discrimination 
faced by Mexican-Americans at the time, the Court stated that the  
 
testimony of . . . officials and citizens contained the admission 
that residents of the community distinguished between ‘white’ 
and ‘Mexican.’ The participation of persons of Mexican descent 
in business and community groups was shown to be slight. Until 
very recent times, children of Mexican descent were required to 
attend a segregated school for the first four grades.170  
 
Even where the historical White/Black binary is broadened to 
include other races, the integrity of the binary is nonetheless preserved 
to some significant degree, and the courts are able to expand protections 
to the Other in such a schema.171 This dynamic seems to pervade the 
courts’ approach to inclusiveness and diversity as far as expansion of 
remedies and protections based on identity is concerned.172  
 
IV. POWER DYNAMICS OF THE BINARY: HOW THE BINARY CONSTRUCTS 
A TRUTH REGIME 
 
The historical modernist binary that the law has employed is 
based upon a classificatory schema that builds legal actuality from a 
politicized construct that is the product of relations of power. The 
historical or traditional binary creates a point on which identity-based 
signifiers can be employed to settle legal cases and controversies that 
involve decision-making processes being based on simplified identity-
                                                 
168 See cases cited supra notes 162–67. 
169 Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478. 
170 Id. at 479 (internal citations omitted). 
171 See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of 
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1297–96 (1982).  
172 Id. 
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based signifiers.173 A prominent example of this can be observed in 
equal protection doctrine and law, which is identity-based 
jurisprudence.174 Judicial remedies and protections rooted in equal 
protection hinge  
 
on the identity trait—such as race or gender—implicated by an 
alleged act of discrimination. In those instances, the identity trait 
stands in to represent a set of assumptions about the group it 
describes: Because that group has been subjected to 
discrimination or politically marginalized in the past, or because 
its identifying characteristic is irrelevant to its members’ ability 
to contribute to or participate in society, the law is particularly 
sensitive to state action that targets such groups.175 
 
A definitive counterpoint therefore emerges in the law 
concerning identity-based signifiers. For example, the Court has posited 
and built upon a racial basis176 for upholding177 or modifying178 the legal 
understanding of race-based educational access policies. The federal 
courts (as well as state courts) are bound by the binaries that the 
Supreme Court employs to expound upon what the Constitution 
means.179 The employment of the binary-based identity signifier thus 
enables a power dynamic to emerge that creates a space that is at once 
                                                 
173 See Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1805 
(2000). “Racism must not be understood as a set of practices that targets a group 
because of some preexisting characteristic of its members, but instead as a set of 
practices that establishes racial hierarchy and assigns individuals to distinctive 
statuses within that hierarchy.” Id. Racial identity—defining and applying it—is a 
product and producer of power. 
174 See Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 
1162, 1179–80 (1977). 
175 Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1605, 1607 (2015). 
176 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that 
state laws establishing separate public schools for black and white students is 
unconstitutional and overruling the Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) doctrine 
of “separate but equal”). 
177 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the affirmative action 
admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School and declaring that the 
Law School had a compelling interest in promoting class diversity). 
178 See Regents of the Univ. of. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (upholding 
affirmative action, allowing race to be one of several factors in a college admission 
policy, but also holding that racial quotas were unconstitutional). 
179 See cases cited supra notes 176–78. 
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determined by, and determines, identity structures as they are 
manifested in a subject’s actions and thoughts as they enter the realms 
of law, policy, and institutions. “[I]n using identity as its organizing 
principle, law is confined to operating within the very structures that 
subordinate and is similarly confined to focusing on the product rather 
than the cause of inequality.”180 
 The binary has thus been and continues to be the site where the 
courts construct legal identity.181 It is also the site where the political 
contestation for the power to define identity takes place, and thus has a 
formative effect on how law conceptualizes, processes, and adjudicates 
cases and controversies. The political and legal dimensions of the binary 
thus establish the binary as a fulcrum wherein limits are set as to how 
an identity manifests in law and society.182 That there is a call for 
moving “Beyond He/She”183 provides a clear example of how a 
traditional identity signifier (Male/Female) is being undermined, 
destabilized, and ultimately how attempts are being made to dispense 
with the binary that has structured law and policy. The law, however, 
despite the pitfalls that attach from subscribing to the binary, has relied 
upon the basic binary to establish legal schema to protect identity, to 
remedy violations of law based on specific identity signifiers.184 The 
persistence of the binary, despite calls to blur or discard the identity 
signifiers that create an enclosed and identifiable identity space, is 
illustrative of the complex processes that are at work in the evolution of 
thought pertaining to identity and the configuration of identity politics 
and the law.185 Yet it seems that those who rail against the identity 
signifier dwell within the structures of the Other, in law, society, and 
identity politics as construed by the modernist identity signifier.  
                                                 
180 Lucas, supra note 175, at 1608. 
181 See ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. & NANCY LEVIT, Un-Natural Things: Constructions 
of Race, Gender, and Disability, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY 173 (Francisco Valdez et al. eds., 2002) (stating that the Supreme 
Court, in many cases, considers the physical differences between men and women in 
making its decisions). 
182 See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 175, at 1627 (arguing that categorizing identity in the 
legal context is “inherently exclusionary” and may “stunt its development” in other 
contexts).  
183 Steinmetz, supra note 38. 
184 See Lucas, supra note 175, at 1626–27. 
185 Id. 
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The foregoing presents a central question:  how can (or rather, 
should) the law go forward with identity-based signifiers without 
importing the negative trappings of said signifiers? Similarly, how can 
the law adapt or reconfigure identity-based signifiers, which are the 
basis of equal protection law,186 among other realms of law and practice, 
so that the courts can fashion a pragmatic and prudential mechanism 
that can withstand change and that transcends the historicity of identity-
based signifiers that serve as benchmarks for measuring progress? The 
identity signifier appears to be at odds with political and sociocultural 
efforts to undermine and discard the binaries that have permeated 
modern law and history. In the case of the standard racial binary of 
Black/White, for instance, one commentator contends that,  
 
[t]here are at least three reasons, however, why an exclusive 
focus on Blacks and Whites is not justified. First, it is important 
to work to eradicate all racism, not just the racism experienced 
by Blacks. Second, it is wrong to assume that racism against 
[other racial identity groups such as Latinos is] simply a less . . 
. virulent form of the same racism experienced by Blacks. . . .  
Finally, our national demographics are changing 
significantly.187  
 
In the case of the traditional racial binary of White/Black, for instance, 
some commentators contend that  
 
[t]he Court has considered race to be the principal protected 
characteristic under the Constitution. The Court has, therefore, 
encouraged an underinclusive, binary discourse about race in 
which the primary views expressed are the white and the [black] 
. . . We are a long way from . . . legal discourse that includes all 
the voices that must be heard.188   
 
The binary, whether or not one agrees with the foregoing contention, 
remains the basis upon which the law is or is not able to conceive and 
                                                 
186 Id. at 1618. 
187 Perea, The Black/White Binary, supra note 158, at 167.  
188 Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary 
Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571, 573 (1995) [hereinafter Perea, Ethnicity 
and the Constitution]. 
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incorporate a juridical subject into preexisting legal-rational constructs 
to adjudicate and administer justice.189 
There perhaps is a growing frustration with attempts to find and 
posit identities that can clearly encompass relevant and unique criteria, 
such as the discrete and insular qualities or traits of a group, that neatly 
ties together such traits with an identity that the law can then act on and 
build upon.190 Before the law, one has to be Either/Or, one or the 
other.191 A juridical subject stands before the law as a legal subject 
infused with a binary nature: in criminal matters, one can only be 
“guilty” or “not guilty,” in civil matters one’s claim is found credible or 
dismissed. In effect, the binary re-imagines the subject and the case or 
controversy as “rational and orderly but obscure[s] the power 
mediations at play.”192 The binary has become inextricably integrated 
into the process “of converting individuals and circumstances to 
cases”193 so that the courts may engage and participate in the meta-
narratives of politicized identity that structure the binary-based identity 
signifier. In the Slaughter House Cases,194 when considering the 
Reconstruction Amendments, that is, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments, the Court stated,  
 
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this 
protection . . . Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the 
mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it 
forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican 
peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop 
slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this 
amendment may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if 
other rights are assailed by the States which properly and 
necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that 
                                                 
189 Id.; Lucas, supra note 175, at 1619 (noting that the current legal construction of 
equal protection is based on general categories of identity). 
190 See Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 573 (arguing that 
the law’s current racial discrimination paradigm is inadequate adequately to 
encompass ethnicity). 
191 Id. 
192 Jennifer Lee, Binary Determination of Guilt or Innocence: Reading Between the 
Lines of People v. Du, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 181, 183 (2003). 
193 Tata, supra note 97, at 428. 
194 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of 
African descent.195  
 
Yet, even when the binary is expanded, that is, stretched beyond its 
initial formulation, the underlying base and resultant conversion of 
subjects into juridical subjects remains.196 For example, the 
White/Black binary, even though it has been expanded to include other 
races/ethnicities, retains its reductionist character and cultural 
understanding of politicized identity. The Black identity signifier as it 
has been construed in the law since the founding of the U.S. in the larger 
White/Black binary continues to inform key terms and rules of 
formation such as prejudice, discrimination, hate speech, and racial 
animus.197 The binary has thus proven resilient – despite its pitfalls. It 
seems that, despite efforts to make identity more fluid, porous, less 
exclusive in nature, the law requires some degree of the opposite of the 
foregoing to maintain its ability to adjudicate identity-based cases. 
Herein lies the rub. What is or should be the fate of the binary going 
forward? 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
The law and the courts, generally speaking, treat identity in a 
similar fashion: one either does or does not qualify for remedies, 
protections, etc., of the law based on whether a subject fits or does not 
fit into a legal identity signifier.198 Why are those the only alternatives? 
Why can a subject not be neither or both? The law cultivates historically 
based identity binaries when converting sociocultural and economic 
realities into legal discourse. Subjects find themselves emplaced within 
politicized binary identities; an identity is manufactured and given to 
subjects by various elites, be it political, economic, social, or legal 
                                                 
195 Id. at 72. 
196 Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 188, at 608–11 (stating that, 
despite expanding the equal protection clause to ethnicity, apparent court confusion 
hampered “meaningful protection”). 
197 Perea, The Black/White Binary, supra note 188, at 155. 
198 See Lucas, supra note 175, at 1626–27 (stating that the Court’s defining of 
identity requires the Court to determine who does or does not fit within the 
category). 
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actors.199 A disconnect exists between the subject and history: if the 
racial binary is undermined and subjects are free to choose their racial 
identities and affiliations independent of whether or not a subject 
possesses what was once the requisite experience that stems from a 
racial identity signifier, then the law will find itself in a predicament. It 
becomes a conflict surrounding the meaning of identity, rather than an 
exercise of inclusion and giving voice and substance to an identity 
group based on modernist-based identity signifiers. The problem with 
retaining symbols of identity is that they are imprinted solely in an 
historically lateral sense, as lynchpins of identity, devoid of the 
historical culmination of social relationships.200 In discarding the 
experiential elements that ground an identity signifier—and the 
experiential dimension is by nature binary in that it is premised on a 
this/that, either/or cognitive framework—what results is a detached and 
exclusionary basis of identity that the subject cannot grasp.201 
The contradictory nature of identity seems to be characterized 
by the notion that there is and is not a center, a basis, for what one is. 
Yet the law views actuality in terms of categories, classifications, 
identity-based signifiers. The Self breathes life into the historical 
structures of identity, so it is both historically determined and 
irrefutably existential. To deconstruct binaries without discarding them, 
i.e., to identify and explicitly acknowledge the deep effect that the 
binary has and the serious distortions and limitations that are immanent 
within it, we can begin a process of productively “destabilizing” 
binaries. 202 “In so doing, these binaries can be recognized as dynamic 
rather than static, fundamentally contingent rather than universal, and 
                                                 
199 See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 175, at 1605 (stating that the Equal Protection 
Clause’s use of identity as the basis of its doctrine can “force people to identify in a 
particular way to lay claim to legal protection”). 
200 See Charlie Gerstein, Comment, What Can the Brothers Malone Teach Us About 
Fisher v. University of Texas?, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 97, 98–99 
(2014) (stating that each state had a system for defining who was considered Black, 
despite a person’s contrary self-identification); see also Andrés Acebo, Life, Liberty 
& the Pursuit of Whiteness: A Revolution of Identity Politics in America, 2 COLUM. 
J. RACE & L. 149, 153–54 (2012) (noting that the Court in Ozawa v. United States, 
260 U.S. 178 (1922) stated that absent clearly classifying people by race would 
create problematic racial overlap). 
201 See Lucas, supra note 175, at 1627 (noting that legal identity categories are 
“inherently exclusionary” and result in over-simplification). 
202 Tata, supra note 97, at 427. 
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synergistic rather than discrete and oppositional . . . binaries are 
revealed as fluid, mutable, and, protean.”203  
The need for order, stability, clarity, and pragmatic and 
functional bases upon which to adjudicate issues and administer justice 
can be acknowledged without the trappings of objectivity that renders 
the binary a rigid and overly artificial and distortionary construct. 
Judicial opinions encompass “choice and order; implicit routine and 
explicit normative principle; analysis and intuition; individualization 
and consistency; rationality and emotion . . . These qualities co-exist 
dynamically, are synergistic, and inhabit each other.”204 While it is 
pragmatic and useful to construct notions such as binary identity to 
create the illusion of concretized identity classifications, the world 
filtered through such classifications reflects a model of a “real world”—
a model that is useful for dealing with the world but that is not in fact 
reflective of any objective truths about the world.205 The model, the 
binary, manufactures truth-value, but it is also subject, like all models 
and constructs, to revision and reconfiguration. The contradictory 
nature of identity, in the locus of a subject that shapes the world and is 
shaped by it, may clear a space for accountability in the culturally 
relativist landscape contoured by law and policy.  
 
                                                 
203 Id.  
204 Id. 
205 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION 416–17 (2008). 
